BYS Newsletter July 2026

Jul 3, 2026 | News Society

REFLECTIONS ON THE BRITISH YEMENI SOCIETY AGM 2026
The 2026 Annual General Meeting was much more than the Society’s annual business meeting. It reflected what the British-Yemeni Society does best: bringing people together, encouraging informed dialogue, strengthening friendships, and ensuring that Yemen remains part of important conversations in the UK.

Listening to Our Members
Following the 2025 AGM, many members told us they wanted more opportunities to meet, exchange ideas and reconnect after the formal meeting. We listened. Our aim this year was therefore twofold: to conduct the Society’s annual business effectively while creating a programme that encouraged discussion, learning and social interaction.

We also wanted members to hear directly from leading voices on Yemen. We were honoured to welcome the British Ambassador to Yemen and the Yemeni Ambassador to the UK to share their perspectives on current developments and the prospects for peace. To complement these official viewpoints, we invited Farea Al-Muslimi of Chatham House to speak about the human cost of the conflict and provide an independent perspective. Together, these speakers offered members a balanced and thought-provoking discussion of one of the world’s most complex crises.

Turning an Ambitious Vision into Reality
An event  of this scale could not have happened without partnership and teamwork. Following  an initial conversation with Professor Adam Hanieh in March, the SOAS Middle East Institute at SOAS generously agreed to host the AGM, providing the venue free of charge while sharing the catering costs with the Society. We are deeply grateful for this support, which enabled us to deliver an event beyond what BYS could have achieved on its own. SMEI’s Imran Ali worked closely with BYS to coordinate the arrangements, while our technical teams spent many weeks planning every detail. Bringing together an AGM for members, presentations from speakers joining both in person and online, multiple digital platforms, live audience participation and a public lecture was a significant logistical challenge.

Every element had to work seamlessly. The AGM itself remained exclusive to members, while the public lecture welcomed a wider audience. One ambassador joined in person, another virtually from Riyadh, requiring Zoom, Microsoft Teams and the lecture theatre’s audiovisual systems to work together. Internal cameras enabled the virtual speaker to engage directly with the audience, creating a genuinely interactive discussion rather than a simple online presentation. The event concluded with an extended question-and-answer session and, just as importantly, the opportunity for members and guests to meet socially afterwards – a request that came directly from our membership.

A Successful and Rewarding Day
We are delighted that the event achieved what we had hoped. The technology functioned smoothly throughout, allowing speakers and audiences – whether attending in person or online – to participate without interruption. This was only possible because of the exceptional professionalism, patience and expertise of both the SOAS and BYS technical teams. Perhaps even more encouraging was the response from members, guests and speakers. We received many separate messages of feedback, almost all of them highly positive.

Among the comments we received were:

‘Thanks so much for a wonderful AGM – brilliantly organised. Congratulations.’

‘I really enjoyed the British Yemeni Society AGM and lecture. Thank you for inviting me.’

‘I would like to express my appreciation for the excellent organisation of the AGM. It was both informative and worthwhile.’

‘Very impressive meeting. If we can only produce the Journal and stage one event like that each year, BYS is still more than worthwhile.’

‘The greatest credit for the success of this event goes to you and your team. It was marked by exceptional organisation and remarkable participation.’

‘The technology very much facilitated the discussion. My huge thanks to Michael for working his magic on the technical side.’

‘It was a pleasure to host BYS at SOAS. We look forward to collaborating again in the future.’

One member suggested that future programmes might provide a clearer distinction between the AGM itself and the public discussion, while allowing more time for audience questions. Constructive feedback such as this is invaluable, and we will carefully consider it as we plan future events.

Recognising the People Behind the Scenes
Successful events rarely happen by accident. Our sincere thanks go to everyone who contributed – from the speakers and panellists to the volunteers, committee members and especially our colleagues at SOAS. Michael received particular praise from many attendees for managing the complex technical arrangements. Characteristically, he was quick to recognise that this success belonged to a much larger team: ‘A large part of that was Andrew and Imran on the SOAS side, whose infrastructure, expertise and support really pulled it through on the day. Just as vital were the earlier conversations we had over Zoom, which put us on the right track.’

His reflections capture an important lesson. Although combining multiple digital platforms created challenges, it also demonstrated what is possible when expertise, planning and partnership come together. The experience has strengthened BYS’s confidence in delivering future hybrid events and expanded what we know we can achieve.

Looking Ahead
The AGM demonstrated that the British Yemeni Society continues to fulfil a unique role. At a time when Yemen often receives limited international attention, BYS remains a trusted space where diplomacy, scholarship, humanitarian concern and public engagement come together. The quality of discussion, the diversity of participants and the strength of the audience’s engagement reaffirmed the value of the Society and its mission.

At the same time, the event reminded us that ambitious programmes require resources and partnerships. The technical complexity of this year’s AGM depended heavily on the expertise and facilities provided by SOAS. While the event proved what is possible, sustaining this level of delivery will require continued collaboration with institutions and partners who share our commitment to informed dialogue on Yemen.

Finally, we extend our sincere thanks to every member, speaker, volunteer, partner and guest who made the 2026 AGM such a success. Your participation, ideas and continued support ensure that the British Yemeni Society remains a vibrant and respected community.

Together, we look forward to building on this success in the year ahead. Taher Qassim and Frances Guy

BYS NEWS

SUBSCRIBING TO BYS
Members should be aware that the Society increased its membership subscription rates in 2026.  The new rates are £30 for Ordinary Members,  £15 for Youth Members, and £150 for Corporate Members.  However, the majority of membership subscriptions are still being paid at the old rates. We cannot amend the amounts that members pay by Standing Order to our Virgin Money account, only you as the account holders can do that.

Accordingly, if you have paid at the old rate in 2026, we would be most grateful if you could both amend your Standing Orders for future years, and pay the difference between the old and new rates for 2026. The British Yemeni Society Virgin Money account has the Sort Code  82-11-07, and the Account Number 00172016.

BYS JOURNAL

BYS Journal
Plans are now well advanced for the publication of the 2026 issue of the BYS Journal which  we aim to publish at the end of October.
We are still looking for someone to take on the responsibility of editing the 2027 Journal and would welcome other volunteers who wish to join the editorial team.  If you are interested or require more information about what is involved, please contact the Editor at editor@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.

FUTURE BYS EVENTS
If you have suggestions for guests to speak on Yemen, please feel free to reach out to the Chair at chair@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.

BRITISH YEMENI SOCIETY ACADEMIC GRANT
I am delighted to report that we have received eight high-quality applications for our 2025/26 academic grant and have therefore decided to make two awards this year.  Our grants committee aims to announce the award winners by the 15th July when BYS members will be informed of their decisions by email.

CONNECTING WITH YEMEN

Friends of Hadhramaut Annual Fundraising Event
Tickets are still available for the Friends of Hadhramaut’s annual fundraising event on the 23rd July this summer. It will begin in the Nash Observatory in Kew Gardens where the renowned taxonomist Dr Shahina Ghazanfar (Honorary Research Associate at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew and Gibbs Fellow at Newnham College, Cambridge) will give an illustrated presentation on ‘The Plants of Southern Arabia’.  It will doubtless be an enjoyable afternoon as the lecture will be followed by an afternoon tea at Fulham Palace.  (Coaches will be provided to ferry attendees from Kew Gardens to Fulham Palace.)  Full details will be distributed to BYS members in the near future.  The Trustees of the Friends of Hadhramaut and Dr S Ghazanfar have agreed that all funds from the event will go towards the purchase of a new X-RAY machine for the Sana Medical Centre in Wadi Rakhiya, Hadhramaut.

Liverpool Arab Arts Festival
The Liverpool Arab Arts Festival (LAAF) will take place very soon: from Friday 17th to Sunday 26th. This year’s theme is HOME, unfolding across a diverse range of disciplines, including music, theatre and performance, visual art, literature and film, with the festival programme culminating at the popular LAAF Family Day on the 26th.

LAAF’s opening night at St George’s Hall, Liverpool L1 1JJ will be a celebration of Yemeni music featuring the mesmerising Al-Awhadel Band.  Centred on the evocative sounds of the oud, the band is led by Yaser Awdhali, an artist and composer from Aden, Yemen.  The concert begins at 7pm; tickets are £10.

For further details and bookings, check the festival website: https://www.arabartsfestival.com/.

Call for information: Coffee trees in Bad Homburg / Kew
We have received a request from Dr Ulrike Stohrer who is researching the history of coffee trees connected to Bad Homburg (Germany), Landgravine Elizabeth,and Kew Gardens. Local archival references suggest that coffee plants were ordered from Kew in 1822. I would be especially grateful for any information that could help clarify whether these plants originally came from Yemen, or whether they were shipped via a Yemeni port. It would also be interesting to know whether coffee plants were ordered for English castles and country houses as well. Was there a trend to plant coffee trees in noble parks and gardens?) Any references, archival leads, correspondence, family/local knowledge, or contact details of helpful people would be very welcome. Please contact Dr Ulrike Stohrer directly at ulli4908@yahoo.com with any information you may have.

Ahmed Ali Hezam (Billy)
We have received an enquiry from Saeed Mohammed Ali Hezam, who has requested that we ask our members if anyone can help his family in its search for his uncle, Ahmed Ali Hezam.  According to Saeed, his uncle, who was widely known in Yemeni diplomatic and cultural circles as ‘Billy’, was active in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly through his work with the British Council in Sana’a and his residency in the Old City.  Saeed and his family have been trying to find information about Ahmed’s later years as he is a valued part of the family’s history, and they have recently found detailed mentions of him in Susan Clough Wyatt’s book, A Thousand and One Days.

If you remember ‘Billy’, have any information about him or how can suggest how Saeed might contact anyone who was close to him please contact Saeed on WhatsApp number (+967 737852987) or by email to ahmedahmedlys49@gmail.com.

YEMEN

POLITICAL UPDATE, APRIL – JUNE 2026

The past quarter in Yemen has been characterised by a continuation of earlier trends and no major developments. Living conditions under Ansar Allah rule are deteriorating further, the regime is becoming more oppressive and the threat of intervention in the Red Sea shifts according to the wider US-Israeli war in Iran.  In the internationally recognised government [IRG] areas, despite initial hopes that the post January developments would bring stability and economic revival, improvements are yet to come.

Clashes on the front lines have continued at their usual limited level throughout the period,  though both sides appear to be reinforcing their positions, possibly in anticipation of an offensive. High-level military meetings have been held by the IRG while the Huthi leadership has called for a general mobilisation.

Huthi-controlled Areas
Developments in areas controlled by Ansar Allah were closely related to the US-Israeli war against Iran. Huthi military participation was limited to six drone attacks against Israel in the final days before the initial ceasefire was agreed on 8th April, followed by Huthi threats of renewed maritime activity in the Red Sea during negotiations for the longer-term deal between the US and Iran. The 17th June ‘Islamabad’ MOU Agreement was followed by speculation that Israel might launch attacks on the Huthis, a possibility if Netanyahu is forced by the US to stop his invasion of Lebanon. For entertainment purposes, one may note that Trump was presumably unaware of the less than happy historical connotations of international agreements finalised in Versailles when he chose to sign the MOU there under the glitter and chandeliers of the Palace. The fact that mutual US and Iranian attacks are already taking place a mere ten days after signature suggests that calling this agreement shaky may be over optimistic.

Internally, worsening living conditions of the population have led to the rise of a ‘hunger’ social media campaign which included posts by known Huthi supporters and reveals the impact of the interruption of humanitarian aid by UN organisations for now close to two years. Resumption is unlikely while the movement continues to hold 73 UN and NGO staff, with no prospect for release. In addition, it is now one and a half years since the US designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, which has significantly reduced banking and other financial transactions in that part of Yemen, as well as Huthi cancellation of the operating licences of thousands of businesses.

As a result, tensions appear to be rising within Ansar Allah, and a reorganisation of its security institutions has been accompanied by the arrest of dozens of their staff, leading others to move to IRG areas. The Huthi–Saudi discussions appear to be proceeding quietly, accompanied by occasional threats to resume attacks. Further thoughts on the dilemma for the Saudis can be read in Helen Lackner’s analysis: https://arabdigest.org/sample-newsletters/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-2/

IRG Area
In January the STC was defeated militarily and later formally dissolved, and a substantial proportion of its leadership joined the Saudi-supported Presidential Leadership Council [PLC]. This was followed by the formation of a new ‘technocratic’ government in February including many former STC leaders. Despite the expectation that the UAE and former leader Zubaidi would try to undermine the new government, there was widespread hope that the situation in that part Yemen would soon achieve stability thanks to Saudi financial support and the new government’s focus on social and economic improvements.

The last three months have been a disappointment. The Saudi-supported military restructuring process is ongoing with notable changes in leadership of some units, particularly on the west coast area under Tareq Saleh’s control. It is not, however, proceeding smoothly everywhere: in June the arrival of a new leader for the Coastguard was the occasion for armed confrontation. Despite financial and fuel contributions by Saudi Arabia, living conditions in two of the three main cities under IRG control, Aden and Mukalla still suffer from an almost complete lack of electricity, and limited water supply. Delays in salary payments throughout the area have not been resolved. No doubt the financial crisis remains at the root of most problems.

The humanitarian situation in the IRG area is dire with the UN assessment that 1.4 million people are now in emergency food insecurity situation and almost 5 million in need, i.e. half the population. It is therefore no surprise that popular discontent and demonstrations have continued, though they are now focused on socio-economic rather than directly political issues.

The STC’s status is unclear: portraits of Zubaidi have been forcibly removed from public sites, raising some opposition. Its offices are alternately opened and closed. Zubaidi, who is believed to be in the UAE, is issuing statements calling for popular revolt. The IRG has asked the UN to put him under sanctions and is believed to be considering a request to Interpol to extradite him to face charges of treason. The Central Bank has ordered the freezing of all STC bank accounts. There is little doubt that support for the STC has significantly reduced, particularly given that many of its earlier factions have now joined the government, but it is also clear that the lack of progress with the ‘south–south’ dialogue promised by the Saudis in January leads some to continue supporting it and is the cause for significant tensions in the region.

Insecurity in Aden persists. In addition to demonstrations protesting about the lack of basic services and poverty, there have been some shocking assassinations. These included that of a couple of Syrian doctors who were driving in the wrong place at the wrong time. Most notable were the assassinations of the British-Yemeni acting leader of the Social Fund for Development [SFD], the main institution managing internationally supported development funding, which recently moved its HQ from Sana’a, following sanctions and the increasing restrictions for organisations operating there. His assassination on 3 May was widely attributed to the Huthis and recently one of the accused is reported to have admitted to a Huthi connection. The other was of an Islahi school director and preacher, whose perpetrators have not been caught.  Given historic hostility of the UAE and STC to all Islah-related connections, speculation as to that assassination is directed in that area. In Hadhramaut journalist Mohamed Aydah, a correspondent for the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya satellite TV channel, was killed in Mukalla in June.

On 28 May President Hadi died in Riyadh, aged 80. He had been suffering heart and other health problems for years, and had  taken no active part in politics since transferring his powers to the PLC in April 2022.  The first Shafi’i president of Yemen, his ten years in the post were mostly a sad period for the country and the presidency. During the two years of the transition, 2012–2014 when there was still hope for a peaceful settlement, he failed to show effective leadership and was swayed by his national and international advisors.  After his move to Riyadh, he hardly ever visited Aden where he was largely unwelcome as the city was under the control of the STC, the successors to the faction which had defeated his own in the 1986 civil war.  This year’s Journal will have a full obituary.

United Nations Activities
There are two main elements to UN involvement in Yemen. On the one hand, UN Special Envoy Grundberg continues travelling between various capitals in attempts to revive the dormant ‘peace process’, most recently in London in late June but he is still not welcome in Sana’a.  Now close to reaching the fifth anniversary of his tenure, his main achievement remains the 2022 truce, and little progress has been made since.  The December agreement for the release of 3,000 prisoners from both sides of the conflict is still scheduled to be implemented in July. It will certainly be a massive relief for the men concerned if the exchange actually happens in coming weeks, but precedent suggests that there may well be more problems ahead.

The UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan is, yet again, significantly underfunded, leading to worsening living conditions and in the middle of the year has barely reached 15% of the required US$ 2.2 billion. The US has contributed nothing and other states’ contributions are way below requirements due to the numerous crises in the region and beyond, alongside the prioritisation of re-armament in the global north. As mentioned above, half the population in the IRG controlled areas are in crisis situation, and the situation is certainly worse for the 20 million or more living under Huthi control, where the only support still arriving is that from remittances. Helen Lackner