BYS Newsletter April 2026

Apr 1, 2026 | News Society

MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR OF THE SOCIETY
The ongoing war involving Israel, the United States and Iran has generated deep fear and uncertainty across the globe. Countries drawn into this conflict – regardless of their choosing – are already experiencing serious consequences.
Although the Huthi militia in Yemen was not initially involved when the war began on 28th February 2026, it has recently escalated its position by launching missiles towards Israel. This shift raises grave concerns. Yemen, already burdened by years of internal conflict and economic collapse, is ill-equipped to absorb further shocks. Any escalation – particularly interference with Red Sea shipping routes – would have devastating consequences for the entire country.
The memory of the Saudi airstrikes on Mukalla in Hadhramaut on 30th December 2025 remains fresh. Yemen is still grappling with their aftermath. Further escalation risks compounding an already dire humanitarian and economic situation.
In this context, the role of the British Yemeni Society (BYS) remains vital. Despite our limited resources, we continue working to ensure Yemen is not forgotten, both among our members and in the wider public discourse.  Internally, BYS is focused on strengthening its operations and sustainability. One immediate priority is securing an affordable venue in London for our meetings, particularly the upcoming AGM in June. Venue costs remain prohibitively high, and we are appealing to our supporters for assistance in identifying or providing suitable spaces.
We extend our sincere thanks to our editor, Dr Noel Brehony, and the editorial committee for their outstanding work in producing and distributing the Journal. However, as agreed at our last AGM, the current print model is no longer financially sustainable. From 2027, the Journal will transition to an online-only format.

Our website is also undergoing a much-needed overhaul. A dedicated volunteer team is working alongside our website designer to deliver both technical improvements and strong editorial content. We aim to complete this project by May 2026.

Our treasurer continues to navigate the increasing challenges posed by banking restrictions and sanctions policies. Transactions associated with Yemen often trigger additional scrutiny, creating obstacles for members – particularly those based outside the UK – when paying subscriptions. Work is underway to streamline payment processes and introduce updated subscription options to ensure accessibility for all members.

Finally, we are proud that the BYS electronic newsletter has been published quarterly since December 2021. We thank our newsletter editor and our secretary, Louise Hosking, for her continued dedication. We warmly invite contributions from our readers; if you would like to write about Yemen, please contact our secretary at: secretary@britishyemenisociety.org.uk

BYS JOURNAL

 BYS Journal
Plans are now well advanced for the publication of the 2026 issue of the BYS Journal in October.  We are, however, still looking for someone to take on the responsibility of editing the 2027 Journal and would welcome other volunteers who wish to join the editorial team.  If you are interested or require more information about what is involved, please contact the Editor at editor@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.

BYS EVENTS IN 2026
If you have suggestions for guests to speak on Yemen, please feel free to reach out to the Chair at chair@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.

BRITISH YEMENI SOCIETY RESEARCH GRANT

BYS Research Grant for 2025/26
We would encourage members to spread the word that, as part of its educational mission, the British Yemeni Society offers a grant of up to £1,000 annually to assist with academic study related to Yemen.  Applications for the 2025/26 academic year are now welcome.

Who Can Apply
Applications are invited from anyone carrying out research in, or on, Yemen at a university, preferably one that is based in Britain or Yemen. (An applicant’s nationality is irrelevant.) Applications may be made to assist with study in any subject or field, so long as it is concerned with Yemen, and is for a specific qualification (e.g., BA, MA, PhD etc.). Post-doctoral researchers may apply but will only be considered should no more suitable junior applicant approach the Committee.

How to Apply
Applicants should write to the Secretary of the Society, Louise Hosking, at the e-mail address: secretary@britishyemenisociety.org and provide:

  • a 300-word abstract of the study,
  • a recommendation from the applicant’s supervisor,
  • a brief CV.

When to Apply
The deadline for applications is 31st May 2026. However, because of the variability in the number of applications received every year and current conditions in Yemen anyone interested is encouraged to contact the Secretary in the first instance, even after the annual deadline.

Conditions
Successful applicants will be required to make an acknowledgment of the grant in their thesis or dissertation. They will also be expected to make a presentation to the Society and/or contribute an article to the BYS Journal on the results of the research assisted by the grant.

Further information
If you require any further information or wish to discuss an application, please contact the Secretary. For information about past awards please go to http:// https://britishyemenisociety.org.uk/what-we-do/

MEMBERS’ NEWS

Research Project
Stephen Weston, a final-year mature student at Birkbeck, University of London, has approached the British Yemeni Society regarding his research project, which explores the historical and political legacies of British imperialism and the Cold War. He is interested in hearing from (or speaking to) members of the Yemeni community in the UK, about their experiences in the PDRY or YAR and the aftermath of unification. Stephen can be contacted through the British Yemeni Society’s secretary or directly via email:

swesto04@student.bbk.ac.uk.

CONNECTING WITH YEMEN

Friends of Hadhramaut Annual Fundraising Event
The Friends of Hadhramaut’s annual fundraising event will be on the 23rd July this year. It will begin in the Nash Observatory in Kew Gardens where the renowned taxonomist Dr Shahina Ghazanfar (Honorary Research Associate at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew and Gibbs Fellow at Newnham College, Cambridge) will give an illustrated presentation on The Plants of Southern Arabia.  It will doubtless be an enjoyable afternoon as the lecture will be followed by an afternoon tea at Fulham Palace.  (Coaches will be provided to ferry attendees from Kew Gardens to Fulham Palace.)  Full details will be distributed to BYS members in the near future.

Liverpool Arab Arts Festival
Liverpool Arab Arts Festival (LAAF), the UK’s longest running annual festival of Arab arts and culture, will returs for its 24th year this July, taking place at various venues across Liverpool from Friday 17th to Sunday 26th. This year’s theme is HOME, unfolding across a diverse range of disciplines, including music, theatre and performance, visual art, literature and film, with the festival programme culminating at the popular LAAF Family Day on the 26th. For further details and bookings, check the festival website: https://www.arabartsfestival.com/.

The festival is a finalist in the People’s Choice Category at the 2026 Liverpool Culture & Creativity Awards, recognised for its ‘Outstanding Contribution to Culture’ in the city.

Yemeni Soldiers in Russia
In January The Guardian provided an insight into Yemenis recruited to serve in the Russian war on Ukraine: ‘I made the biggest mistake’: the young Yemeni men lured into the Russian army with empty promises | Yemen | The Guardian

BBC Radio 4 Memoir of Gujaratis living in Tanzania and Ade
A 2021 series about a group of Indians, Kenyans and a Yemeni who came to UK but also lived in Aden is still available on BBC Sounds. It is interesting on many counts, particularly highlighting the Indian Ocean diaspora and the intertwined history of people from the region.  To listen, use the link: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m000w9tx?partner=uk.co.bbc&origin=share-mobile.

Naseem Hamed on Boxing, Racism and His Greatest Regret
A Guardian article in January featured an interview with the British WBO boxing champion, who was born in Sheffield to Yemeni parents: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2026/jan/10/naseem-hamed-big-interview-boxing-brendan-ingle-film-giant.

Articles and a Podcast on Yemen by Helen Lackner
In addition to the article mentioned at the end of the Political Report, Helen has kindly provided links to other articles and a podcast: an Arab Digest article, ‘Five Cities in Yemen’ from mid-February: https://arabdigest.org/sample-newsletters/five-cities-in-yemen-2/  and an Arab Digest podcast from mid-January, ‘A black eye in Yemen for the UAE’: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a-black-eye-in-yemen-for-the-uae/id1502904460?i=1000745082191 A Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies article focuses on a few items from her collection of Yemeni artisanal and decorative items: https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/oct-dec-2025/26144

Sana’a since 2014
On 22nd January The Ecologist published an article by Samar Azazi, ‘Sana’a under Siege’ describing the devasting effects of Yemen’s civil war on the country’s capital city: Sana’a under siege

YEMEN

POLITICAL UPDATE APRIL 2026

The launch of US and Israeli attacks on Iran has dominated the region and is drawing in Yemen, which has seen critical internal changes since the start of 2026.

Saudi Arabia and a restructured Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) led by Rashad al-Alimi, now enjoying much greater authority, moved rapidly to consolidate control of the south following the tumultuous events of December and early January. At the end of 2025 it seemed that the Southern Transitional Council (STC) had extended its governance to Hadhramaut and Al Mahra. By mid-January all of south Yemen was under the control of the PLC, the STC had dissolved itself, its leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi had been expelled from the PLC (along with one of his deputies Faraj al-Bahsani), charged with treason and had fled the country. The STC and its UAE backers paid the price of crossing Riyadh’s redlines in capturing areas close to the Saudi border in what looked like a unilateral attempt to create a de facto southern state. It was an extraordinary miscalculation by both the STC and the UAE.

Saudi Arabia responded by abandoning its previous reactive approach to the PLC Yemen and reverted to the proactive policies of the late Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz following the end of the 1960s civil war. National Shield forces, trained, equipped and supported by Saudi Arabia and under the political control of Rashad al-Alimi, restored PLC control. One sign of this new Saudi approach was the re-emergence of the Special Committee for Yemen that was used to manage networks of political, tribal and local leaders sympathetic to, or incentivised to support, Saudi interests. Its head, Mohammed bin Obaid Al-Qahtani, played an overt political role in mobilising support for the PLC in Hadhramaut. Hitherto, the Special Committee operated in the background with Muhammad al-Jaber, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, taking the overt political lead under Prince Khaled bin Salman, the Saudi minister of Defence.

Restructuring the Presidential Leadership Council
Abdul Rahman al-Mahrami, the commander of the Giants’ Brigades and previously a deputy to al-Zubaidi in the STC, has been given an expanded political and security role. He now seems the most influential southern politician working with Saudi Arabia whilst retaining ties to the UAE (as does Tareq Saleh, head of the National Resistance Forces based in Mocha). New members of the PLC are Mahmoud al-Subaihi, a prominent and influential former general from south Yemen and Salam al-Khanbashi, the governor of Hadhramaut who played a role in expelling the STC from that governorate. The balance within the PLC suggests that it will favour a solution to the southern question within a united Yemen.

Restructuring the Military
A new Military Committee under al-Alimi will work with the leadership of the Coalition to Support Legitimacy (i.e., Saudi armed forces) in restructuring the PLC’s military forces. Saudi Arabia is paying the wages of the army and the various militias including the Security Belt Forces and other STC militias which are being integrated into the new military structure, often under new commanders. The most important will be the National Shield Forces, which has a new commander: Brigadier Bassam Mahdhar Ali, an experienced officer. He, like many in the National Shield, are southerners.

A New Cabinet
The creation of a new government with no less than 35 ministers (previously there were 25) under the experienced new prime minister Shaya Mohsen Al-Zindani, who is a southerner. Like previous cabinets, it attempts to balance various political and geographical influences (it includes three women). Analysts assess that twelve minsters are linked to Islah and seven to the disbanded STC. Political balancing is bound to be important, but this cabinet will have to show people, especially those in Aden where support for the STC and for a restored southern state is high, that it has the will, competence and resources to deal with the wide range of economic and social problems that blight the lives of so many Yemenis. A number of new governors have been appointed including for Aden, Lahej, Abyan and Dhala.

More Saudi Economic Support
Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide a total of $368 million to support the government’s budget and address energy shortages through the delivery of oil derivatives. Reports suggest Riyadh has budgeted for a further $3 billion to cover the salaries of civil servants and the militias that were previous paid by the UAE.  Riyadh will need to maintain this level of support for months and probably years ahead.

Addressing the Southern Issue
The Saudi message to the south is that Riyadh understands the centrality of the southern issue.  However, it can only be addressed after the new PLC-led governance has stabilised and the Huthi issue solved by war or negotiation. Saudi Arabia is to organise a dialogue by southern leaders. Consultations have been taking place, but no date has been and the signs are that it will not happen for some time.

A group of senior STC leaders, along with other southern leaders who were invited to Riyadh in January, decided to dissolve the organisation.  This was immediately rejected by the STC leadership in Aden (with claims that the leaders in Riyadh were acting under duress) and in the STC heartland – the so-called triangle that covers much of Dhala and Lahej and part of Abyan – there were large demonstrations in support of the STC.  Significant quantities of weapons and equipment were moved from Aden to Dhala in early January, raising fears that the STC there might resort to insurgency. The situation has quietened in recent weeks but the enduring strength of the STC in its populous core areas should not be underestimated. Without UAE financial and organisational support, however, the residual STC is much weaker and, as noted, its military forces are being absorbed into new political structures with wages paid by Saudi Arabia. The STC complains of restrictions in Aden on its political activities.

The STC presented itself as an umbrella organisation and had absorbed a number of the dozens of southern groups, mostly small but some are important locally. Saudi Arabia and the PLC will hope that they can create a consensus among the remaining southern groups that they should work with the PLC on how best to achieve southern self-determination within a unified Yemen whilst not completely ruling out the possibility of a referendum on the question of eventual independence.

Ansar Allah
The changes taking place with the PLC-controlled part of Yemen are in part designed to create a regime that would make both a credible negotiating partner for Ansar Allah and a viable military force if it chooses to fight. Saudi Arabia has maintained contact with the Huthis over the potential implementation of a road map for a future Yemen. A key part of that will be a commitment to pay the salaries of Huthi military and state employees – with an understanding that no further missile or drone attacks would be made on the kingdom.

Iran and the Ansar Allah
A new uncertainty is the possibility that the Huthis might again try to close the Bab al Mandab for international shipping in support of Iran. That would have the effect of halting oil exports from Yanbu’ in Saudi Arabia to which oil from the Eastern Province oilfields are being piped to get around the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move would cause substantial damage to the world economy. So far, the Huthis have launched what looked like token attacks on military targets in southern Israel.

Ansar Allah has been uncharacteristically cautious – for good reason.  The Huthis want to avoid a repetition of damaging attacks on their military and civilian leadership and infrastructure by the Israelis and the US. Their economy has also been under pressure from the implementation of the US designation of the Huthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, making it easier for the PLC to force banks to move their headquarters to Aden and to take other steps that put financial stress on the Huthi regime. Huthi leaders have been speaking of claims for compensation and reparation of $27 billion for the damage done by Saudi Arabia to Yemen since 2015. They are aware that Saudi Arabia will pay all state salaries as part of the Road Map to a future Yemen.

The Huthis must weigh the likely harm to their long-term interests when deciding whether to comply with any possible Iranian request to close the Bab al-Mandab. However, they will act if President Trump orders any ground offensive against Iran.  For more on this please see Helen Lackner’s analysis at https://arabdigest.org/sample-newsletters/huthis-and-the-iran-war-2/.