MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR OF THE SOCIETY
As we say goodbye to 2025 and welcome 2026, we do so with hope — for peace, stability, and prosperity — and with sincere wishes for good health and wellbeing for the people of Yemen, Britain and our wider world.
I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to all BYS members for your continued support over the past year and in the years ahead. Your commitment sustains the work of our Society. I also warmly welcome the new members who have recently joined BYS. To those who wish to become members, you are most welcome to join us by registering through our website: https://britishyemenisociety.org.uk/membership/
Since 2023, all new memberships have been processed through the BYS website. We strongly encourage existing members to use the same platform for annual subscriptions. This approach significantly reduces administrative burdens and allows our volunteers — who generously give their time and energy — to focus on meaningful activities that serve our community.
We deeply value the efforts of our volunteers who continue to keep BYS active despite limited resources. Organising in-person events has become increasingly challenging due to the rising costs of hiring venues in London, yet our commitment to community engagement remains firm.
While Christmas and the New Year were celebrated in Britain and around the world, Yemen briefly witnessed a moment of hope. On 23 December 2025, an agreement signed in Oman led to the planned release of thousands of detainees held by the Huthis and the internationally recognised government (IRG), as confirmed by the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg. This development was welcomed by countless Yemeni families who have endured years of anguish, longing for the return of their loved ones.
Tragically, this hope was short lived. On 8 December 2025, Reuters reported that the Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized control of Hadhramaut and Mahara provinces in eastern Yemen under a military operation codenamed ‘Promising Future’. On 26 December 2025, The Guardian reported that Saudi air forces struck STC positions and urged their withdrawal from Hadhramaut.
On 30 December 2025, The Guardian published a statement by Yemen’s IRG President, Rashad Al-Alimi, describing the STC’s actions as a coup backed by the UAE. He declared a three-month state of emergency, demanded the immediate withdrawal of UAE forces from Yemen, and called for STC forces to leave Hadhramaut and Mahara.
What is particularly alarming in this latest escalation is the speed and scale of conflict among military groups and militias that were originally formed — eleven years ago — as a coalition against the Huthis. Today, these same forces are turning against one another, fighting in areas far removed from Huthi control, deepening Yemen’s fragmentation and suffering.
We observe these developments with deep concern as the vast majority of Yemeni citizens remain powerless spectators to events shaping their future. Millions continue to struggle daily for the most basic necessities: clean water, sanitation, food, electricity, cooking gas, and fuel for transportation.
Despite this bleak reality, BYS remains hopeful. We believe that wise, courageous Yemeni women and men will ultimately rise to exercise their civic responsibility and moral authority to bring an end to these destructive and senseless wars, and to reclaim Yemen’s future for peace and dignity.
Taher Qassim MBE
Chair
BYS JOURNAL
BYS Journal 2026
The Editorial Committee of the BYS Journal is planning for the publication of the 2026 issue of the journal in October. We will include the usual report of the BYS Chair delivered at the society’s AGM and a political update. The committee is already in touch with a few authors about some prospective articles but would like to encourage members and friends of the BYS to offer to write articles (up to 4,000 words) and book reviews (up to 1,000 words for the 2026 journal) or to propose ideas for contributions that the committee might then commission others to write. Articles can be about any aspect of Yemen covered by the BYS’s objectives of ‘advancing, public education and knowledge concerning the Republic of Yemen, its history, geography, economy and culture’. Articles can also be about aspects of British–Yemeni relations, the British–Yemeni community in the UK and personal reminiscences about living and working in Yemen. We also publish obituaries of people who made outstanding contributions to Yemen, British–Yemeni relations and the BYS itself. For more information, please contact editor@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.
BYS EVENTS IN 2026
If you have suggestions for guests to speak on Yemen please feel free to reach out to the Chair at chair@britishyemenisociety.org.uk.
BRITISH YEMENI SOCIETY RESEARCH GRANT
BYS Research Grant for 2025/26
We would encourage members to spread the word that, as part of its educational mission, the British Yemeni Society offers a grant of up to £1,000 annually to assist with academic study related to Yemen. Applications for the 2025/26 academic year are now welcome.
Who Can Apply
Applications are invited from anyone carrying out research in, or on, Yemen at a university, preferably one that is based in Britain or Yemen. (An applicant’s nationality is irrelevant.) Applications may be made to assist with study in any subject or field, so long as it is concerned with Yemen, and is for a specific qualification (e.g., BA, MA, PhD etc.). Post-doctoral researchers may apply but will only be considered should no more suitable junior applicant approach the Committee.
How to Apply
Applicants should write to the Secretary of the Society, Louise Hosking, at the e-mail: secretary@britishyemenisociety.org and provide:
- a 300-word abstract of the study,
- a recommendation from the applicant’s supervisor,
- a brief CV.
When to Apply
The deadline for applications is 31 May 2026. However, because of the variability in the number of applications received every year and current conditions in Yemen anyone interested is encouraged to contact the Secretary in the first instance, even after the annual deadline.
Conditions
Successful applicants will be required to make an acknowledgment of the grant in their thesis or dissertation. They will also be expected to make a presentation to the Society and/or contribute an article to the BYS Journal on the results of the research assisted by the grant
Further information
If you require any further information or wish to discuss an application, please contact the Secretary. For information about past awards please go to http:// https://britishyemenisociety.org.uk/what-we-do/
MEMBERS’ NEWS
We have recently learnt of the death of a long-standing member and supporter, Patricia Tomlinson. The Society sends its sincere condolences to Mrs Tomlinson’s family.
CONNECTING WITH YEMEN
V&A Culture in Crisis Event: Trade, Trafficking and Translation: Exploring Yemen’s Cultural Heritage with Alia Ali
In October last year the V&A hosted an in-person event connecting the research of the museum’s Jameel Fellow Alia Ali, with the museum’s own work to support and protect Yemeni cultural heritage. To access the event go to: Online content – Listing | Culture in Crisis.
Readers might also like to like to read about the 2023 agreement between the museum and the Republic of Yemen which established this research programme: https://www.vam.ac.uk/search?q=culture+in+crisis+yemen&astyped=
The Yemeni Community in the UK
Now then, a magazine for Sheffield, has published an article by Dr Abdul Galil Shaif entitled ‘The Yemeni Journey in Sheffield: Struggle, Solidarity and Renewal’ that examines ‘four generations of strength, community and achievement – from steelworkers to MPs, professors and young visionaries shaping the future’ of Sheffield. The article follows the experiences of the Yemeni community in Sheffield from the arrival of its first Yemenis over 150 years ago to the election of the Abtisam Mohamed MP, the first person of Arab descent to be elected to Parliament:
The Yemeni Journey in Sheffield: Struggle, Solidarity and Renewal | Now Then Sheffield
Friends of Hadhramaut Annual Fundraising Event
The Friends of Hadhramaut has informed us that the renowned botanist and author, Dr Shahina Ghazanfar (Research Fellow at the Herbarium, Kew Gardens and at Newnham College, Cambridge) will give an illustrated presentation on The Flora of Southern Arabia at the Nash Observatory in Kew Gardens, on the 23rd July 2026.
We will include further details of the event in our April Newsletter.
Articles on Yemen
Helen Lackner has provided links to two articles she has written on Yemen since our October Newsletter:
https://arabdigest.org/sample-newsletters/southern-separatists-make-their-move-in-yemen-2/
https://jacobin.com/2025/12/yemen-civil-war-saudi-uae-stc-houthis
YEMEN
YEMEN POLITICAL UPDATE
5 January 2026
This article is an attempt to summarise for BYS members the tumultuous events of the last few weeks whilst respecting that there are opposing views on the issues involved.
This crisis began with deployment by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) of forces from early December to Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra. Working with the STC-aligned Hadhrami Elite Forces, the STC took over control of the Second Military District based in coastal Hadhramaut and moved from there to secure the Wadi Hadhramaut, notably Saiyun, in effect displacing/taking over from regular Yemeni army units and forcing elements of the National Shield Forces (trained by Saudi Arabia and loyal to the Head of the Presidential Leadership Council [PLC]), Rashad al-Alimi, to withdraw into Saudi Arabia or remain in their camps. The STC moved against the Hadhrami Tribal Alliance headed by Amr bin Habrish which had taken control of the Masila oil fields and other facilities using the recently created Hadhramaut Protection Forces. The STC justified its actions as being necessary to counter terrorism and Huthi smuggling and restore stability. It claimed that it had sought to coordinate its moves with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There was fighting, but this was mostly arranged by negotiated takeovers and by 29 December the STC appeared to have achieved its objectives. Demonstrations were organised in the south to show popular support for these moves – and there were calls for the STC leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi to declare a new southern state. It appeared that the STC could claim that it was now the dominant influence in all parts of the south.
Rashad al-Alimi left Aden for Saudi Arabia along with the prime minister, other ministers and the recently appointed Governor of Hadhramaut, Salem Ahmed Said al-Khanbashi. Saudi Arabia pulled its few soldiers from Aden and other parts of the south. Saudi Arabia first arranged a visit by a joint Saudi–Emirati team to Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra to negotiate a settlement. When this failed, Prince Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi defence minister, publicly said that it was ‘time for the STC in this sensitive stage to prioritise the voice of reason, wisdom, the public interest, and unity of the ranks by responding to the Saudi–Emirati mediation efforts to end the escalation, withdraw their forces from the camps in the two governorates, and hand them over peacefully to the National Shield forces and the local authority’. There were reports that Saudi forces and 20,000 National Shield forces were on the Saudi side of the border and ready to move into Hadhramaut. Many of the National Shield forces are from the south.
Events took a dramatic turn for the worse when two shipments of armoured vehicles arrived in Mukalla from Fujairah in what appeared to be open UAE support for the southern forces. Several of these vehicles were destroyed or damaged by Saudi aircraft: the Saudi Ministry of Defence said that arms were unloaded from the ships and were destined for the STC, something the UAE denied.
On 30th December Rashad al-Alimi declared a 90-day state of emergency. All military forces in Hadramaut and Al-Mahra were ordered to co-ordinate fully with the Saudi-led coalition and immediately hand over all positions to the National Shield Forces. A ban was imposed on all sea and air movements except when approved by the Saudi-led coalition. Al-Alimi demanded that the UAE withdraw all its forces from Yemen. His statement was promptly rejected by the four UAE-backed leaders of the PLC who said that the ‘PLC is a collective body whose decisions are taken by consensus, or by majority in the event consensus is not possible. Under no circumstances does it permit unilateral decision-making on sovereign, military, or major political matters.’ The statement ignored the fact that the STC moved into Hadhramaut, and Al-Mahra had not been approved by the PLC!
This was followed by a highly significant statement issued by the Saudi Foreign Ministry blaming the UAE for ‘pressurising’ the STC to conduct military operations close to the Saudi border, declaring that the action was highly dangerous and reminding the UAE of the need for collective action and respect for Saudi red lines. The Saudis have used relatively conciliatory language in addressing the STC, stressing the benefits for the south from sticking with the agreements made at the time the PLC was created, notably that the question of the south would be an important part of post conflict negotiations in which the STC would be represented. Riyadh also stressed the importance of removing UAE forces from Yemen in line with al-Alimi’s edict and of the UAE stopping financial and military support for any group in Yemen.
The UAE withdrew all its forces from Yemen in response though it is uncertain if the UAE will stop financing the STC. Saudi aircraft made three attacks on STC forces in Nuhoub base, Ghayl bin Yameen, the site of confrontation between STC forces and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance. No casualties were reported and the strikes seemed intended to demonstrate to the STC what their forces would face if they did not take heed of what Riyadh and the PLC chair wanted. Saudi aircraft also overflew STC units in Hadhramaut in a show of force.
Saudi Arabia was at that stage offering the STC the carrot of the potential benefits of collaborating with the Saudis and the stick of the Saudi capacity to inflict severe damage from the air on STC forces if they did not comply. When the STC ignored Saudi and PLC requests to withdraw their forces, however, National Shield Forces moved to force them out of the Wadi, Mukalla and Rayan. Saudi aircraft attacked STC forces. They made rapid progress and the STC started withdrawing the forces it had deployed to Hadhramaut and Al Mahra.
STC and the UAE
What role the UAE played in all this is disputed but the STC would not have planned and executed these moves without UAE knowledge. Saudi Arabia thinks it went rather further than that. The UAE supports the STC financially. The longer established STC militias are paid via the coalition, but it is not clear who pays for newer groups such as those that spearheaded the STC moves in Hadramaut. It seems highly likely that the UAE will continue to support the STC though less overtly than hitherto in deference to Saudi wishes.
Why Has This Happened?
The origin of the problem goes back to 2015 when, in response to the Huthi takeover, Emirati forces, with their experience of working in other conflict and post-conflict zones trained, equipped and mentored southern resistance units to drive the Huthis out of Aden and the south and provide the security forces needed for the return of government. In all some 120,000 men received training. When the STC was created in 2017, it was in effect a merger of UAE supported organisations and militias in the south; most of them wanted to restore a southern state. The UAE was also behind the aborted coalition plan to capture Hodeida in 2018 recruiting and training what are now the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh (based in Mocha) of which the Southern Giants Brigade (clearly aligned with the STC) are a major part. When it was called off the UAE withdrew most of its forces from Yemen leaving small numbers in a few strategic locations, ostensibly for counter-terrorism purposes. It suited UAE strategic interests to have a friendly force along the Yemeni coastal areas and controlling major ports and vital sea routes. Three of the eight were from the south – Al-Zubaidi, Abdul Rahman al-Mahrami, the head of the Southern Giants Brigades, and Faraj Bahsani, a former governor of Hadhramaut. Together with Tareq Saleh they were backed by the UAE; the remaining members were Saudi sponsored.
In 2015 Saudi Arabia took responsibility for the north where the aim was to rebuild the Yemeni armed forces to enable them to contain and defeat the Huthis. Saudi support for the Yemeni army and its air power helped prevent the Huthis from taking control of Marib (and parts of Ta’izz) and protecting the Saudi border with the former north Yemen. Since 2022 its policy (and notionally that of the UAE) was to make the Yemeni government in the form of the PLC a credible regime able to confront or negotiate with the Huthis, allowing Saudi Arabia to reduce its involvement and pull back to defending its borders. The STC action undermined Saudi strategy. The main beneficiary would appear to have been the Huthis.
Towards Reconciliation?
On 2nd January 2026, the STC issued what it called a ‘Constitutional Declaration of the State of the South Arabia’ which appears to assert that this is an independent and sovereign state within the internationally recognised borders of the former PDRY with its capital Aden. It includes a clause that states ‘A transitional period of two years, which may be extended for a period not exceeding the original period, shall be determined by a decision of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, and shall aim to create the necessary conditions and conditions for the building of a democratic civil state based on the popular will, the rule of law and good governance.’ The STC falls short of asserting independence now, but the long-term aim is clear.
Saudi Arabia has agreed, at the request of Rashad al-Alimi, to host urgently a South–South conference in Riyadh involving the STC and other southern groups to find a way forward. Riyadh, despite the attack on the STC in Hadhramaut, recognises the strength of the southern cause and understands that it will have to be addressed once the current crisis subsides.The STC has agreed to attend noting that it is a practical translation of the approach adopted by the STC since its establishment.
Why Did This Happen Now?
It is not clear why the UAE/STC decided to act at this time. Tensions have been growing between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over Sudan (where they are supporting different sides in the civil war) and the Horn of Africa and they have long been competing commercially. The STC may control Aden and much of the area around, but it has to work through the PLC government which is weak and lacks the resources to deal with the problems facing people in Aden and other southern cities. As part of the PLC the STC had to face criticism for the failures of governance. STC leaders have been under pressure from members who want it to leave the PLC and there were signs that the leadership felt that it needed to act. However, It was, however, an error to move into Hadramaut, which shares a long border with Saudi Arabia, and Al-Mahra, which shares a border with Oman that abuts on to the Saudi border. Both states have a major interest in who controls the border area and the routes to it. The STC moved into an area of fundamental strategic importance to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has now made it clear that it is unacceptable.
The Significance of Hadhramaut
Hadhramaut houses the most productive sources of Yemen oil which any regime will want to control. It is known for its distinct identity and was part of British South Arabia before 1967 when it was run separately from the rest of South Arabia and was divided between two sultanates. It was integrated into the PDRY after a brief period of fighting in 1967 but was under-represented in the PDRY institutions from the outset. It was never able to exert the influence in the PDRY (or Republic of Yemen) that its potential wealth and influential diaspora deserved though individual Hadhramis occupied top positions in the regime and ruling party: it was the Hadhrami Ali Salim al-Bidh that signed the 1990 unity agreement with the north. In recent years there has been a resurgence of Hadhrami identity visible in institutions like the various councils that have been set up to voice Hadhrami demands. Today it seems that a substantial number of Hadhramis want greater autonomy (even independence) for the region in whatever regime emerges in Aden or Sana’a.
The Longer Term
The main beneficiary of these events are the Huthis, who had been weakened by previous US and Israeli air attacks (which appear to have killed more senior Huthi military officers than was first announced). Recent steps by the PLC to undermine the Huthi economy have been effective, and the signs were that the Huthis would soon face increasing pressure from the people they control.
The key to stabilising the situation, at least for the time being, lies in an accommodation that addresses southern identity (or identities), satisfies Saudi interests, retains the loyalty of the pro-union forces and keeps the UAE involved. This will not be easy, but the south–south conference is a promising first step.
